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COMMENT: WHERE DOES
CREATIVITY COME FROM? AND
OTHER STORIES OF COPYRIGHT
Michael J. Madisont
In this brief Commentary, I want to take up some of the ques-
tions implicit in Lydia Loren's Untangling the Web of Music
Copyrights ("Untangling the Web") 1 and to use those questions to
frame some broader themes. Untangling the Web is an ingenious
paper, because it takes the Supreme Court's decision in New York
Times Co. v. Tasini2 for what it is (a story about copyright law)
rather than for what it appears to be (an analysis of a rather ob-
scure provision of the Copyright Act of 1976). The Court's story
of copyright is about "Authors" - "Authors" who happen to bejournalists, historians, and freelance writers and researchers. The
Court tells a simple story, with a simple premise. The Court wants
justice for Authors. Untangling the Web takes the Court's premise
and tells a richer and more complex story, the story of a "web" of
overlapping and unclear copyright interests, based on Authors'
interests, that have captured a particular industry (composers and
recording artists and various institutional players in the music
business), ensnaring creators and consumers. As I explain below,
Untangling the Web resolves its story of copyright in a sensible
way, but it leaves some possibilities - other plot lines, other reso-
lutions - unexplored. There are at least two stories of copyright
here. Are there more?
The Supreme Court in Tasini notwithstanding, we know that
there are multiple stories of copyright. And about copyright. The
alternative narrative presented in Untangling the Web itself implies
as much. Copyright doctrine suggests stories of artists, artisans,
t Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Email: madi-
son@law.pitt.edu. Copyright 2002 Michael J. Madison. This Commentary is based on a talk
presented at the Symposium held at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law on
November 1, 2002, entitled Copyright in the Digital Age: Reflections on Tasini and Beyond.
Many thanks to Craig Allen Nard, the organizer of the Symposium, for inviting me to partici-
pate, and to the editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review, for giving me the opportunity
to expand on my talk.
Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 673 (2003).
2 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
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tradespeople, and industries with different but overlapping inter-
ests, all expressed through the prism of a single body of law.
There are stories at different levels of abstraction and stories of no
abstraction at all, only the concrete. Tasini presents one such
story, Untangling the Web resolves another. Below, I suggest
what some additional stories might be. As Jessica Litman pointed
out recently, 3 in ongoing debates over the shape of copyright law
and policy there are disparities in financial and rhetorical resources
that advantage copyright industries in contemporary copyright
story-telling. The story implicitly told by the Court in Tasini may
or may not reflect that advantage, but its story of copyright, like
any story, is fairly deserving of challenge.
The stories I suggest are inspired by the motion picture indus-
try, rather than by the music business ("Music Copyrights," in the
title of the main paper), or the world of the Internet ("the Web"),
or the world of journalists and historians (Tasini). This is partly
my own idiosyncrasy, since I am a movie fan. In truth, my first
reaction to the argument of Untangling the Web, that there are too
many copyright interests represented in the music business, was a
quotation from the film adaptation of Amadeus, a reference that I
explain below. It represents an appeal to the inherent if conven-
tional narrative form that Western motion pictures have given au-
diences for decades. 4 Story-telling has a long and respected pedi-
gree as a tool of legal persuasion, and motion picture melodrama
is, in contemporary culture, an almost uniquely effective form of
story-telling.5 What follows, then, is a series of stories inspired by
3 See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337 (2002). Coyright
debates, it has been observed, often involve a s much mythology as reality. See Jessica Litman,
Copyright as Myth, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 235 (1991); Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copy-
right's Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 37 (2002).
4 On narrative structure and narrative construction in legal practice, see Anthony B.
Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 55 (1992). For an analysis of adapting film narrative to legal practice, see Philip N.
Meyer, "Desperate for Love": Cinematic Influences Upon a Defendant's Closing Argument to a
Jury, 18 VT. L. REV. 721 (1994). For histories of narrative in film, see DAVID A. COOK, A
HISTORY OF NARRATIVE FILM (3d ed. 1996); JOHN L. FELL, FILM AND THE NARRATIVE TRADI-
TION (1974). For quite different analyses of narrative form in motion pictures, see SEYMOUR
CHATMAN, COMING TO TERMS: THE RHETORIC OF NARRATIVE IN FICTION AND FILM (1990)
(discussing a language-based approach); CHRISTIAN METZ, FILM LANGUAGE: A SEMIOTICS OF
THE CINEMA (1974) (discussing a semiotics-based approach); GEORGE M. WILSON, NARRATION
IN LIGHT: STUDIES IN CINEMATIC POINT OF VIEW (1986) (arguing that an internal rather than
external narrative perspective is required).
5 For one excellent recent example of a critique of advocacy from a story-telling perspec-
tive, see Philip N. Meyer, Making the Narrative Move: Observations Based Upon Reading
Gerry's Spence's Closing Argument in the Estate of Karen Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, Inc., 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 229 (2002). On the use of literary devices in judicial opinions, see Martha C.
Nussbaum, Poets as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
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motion pictures and intended both as illustrations of the multiple
ways of framing copyright controversies and as tools for advocates
and analysts.
I. THE STORY OF NEW YORK TIMES Co. v. TASINI
On the surface, Tasini is not much of a tale. The New York
Times, among other publications, purchased freelance articles
written by Jonathan Tasini and fellow freelancers, published them
in its print editions, and then re-published them electronically, by
including those articles in searchable electronic databases. The
republication occurred without the permission of the original au-
thors, raising a presumptive case of copyright infringement. The
publications defended their practices by invoking section 201(c) of
the Copyright Act, which permits the publisher of a collective
work to republish contributions to that collective work copyrighted
by others, so long as the republication is a "revision" of the origi-
nal collective work.6 Newspapers are copyrighted as collective
works. The legal issue before the Supreme Court was whether re-
publishing newspapers in searchable electronic databases consti-
tuted making "revisions" of those collective works.7 The Court
ruled that the revision privilege did not apply. 8 So far, so simple,
and from the standpoint of pure statutory interpretation, probably
unremarkable.
From a narrative standpoint, in the hands of the Court major-
ity, this was not really the story of Tasini at all. To the Court, the
case presented a noble Author, Jonathan Tasini, and five col-
leagues, standing tall against institutional forces that in effect con-
spired to appropriate the value of the Authors' art, without their
permission or fair compensation. Tasini, the lawsuit, was the story
of a freelance journalist, Tasini, and his fight against the corporate
culture of modern publishing.9
This narrative is subtle but apparent from the very outset of
the Court's opinion: "Respondents are . . . authors (Authors)."' 0
The original publishers of their works are the "Print Publishers,""
and the companies responsible for the electronic databases in
1477 (1995); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1386-90 (1995).
6 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000).
7 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483,492-93 (2001).
8 Id. at 492.
9 The lead plaintiff in the lawsuit is president of the National Writers' Union, an affiliate
of the AFL-CIO. Information about the NWU and its role in the Tasini litigation is available at
National Writers Union Home Page, at http://www.nwu.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2002).
10 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 488.
I /d. at 489.
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which the Authors' articles ultimately appeared are the "Electronic
Publishers.' The manner in which the Court abstracts the par-
ties' identities neatly sets the stage for its statutory analysis. Sec-
tion 201(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976 allocates rights in a col-
lective work so as to protect authors from the superior bargaining
power of publishers and to protect the interests of freelance au-
thors in selling their articles to others on a stand-alone basis even
after initial publication in a collective work. 13 Publication of free-
lance articles in electronic databases is a form of stand-alone pub-
lication since the searchability of the databases means that each
article can be retrieved absent the context provided by the original
collective work. 14 The database user reads the work of the Author,
in other words, rather than the work of the Publisher. The Author
vs. Publisher narrative abstraction also feeds nicely into the major-
ity's climactic rhetorical flourish, an unprecedented Supreme
Court appeal to "authorial rights" as a policy justification for its
interpretation of section 201(c).15 If the "Publishers" want access
to the Authors' works, the Publishers can and should pay for that
access. And so the curtain falls on the Publishers' defense.
II. THE STORY OF UNTANGLING THE WEB OF MUSIC COPYRIGHTS
Untangling the Web recognizes the Court's opinion for what it
is, a narrative about the role of authors and publishers rather than
an interpretation of the revision privilege of section 201(c). The
article situates that narrative in the context of the music industry,
and then proceeds to retell the story. No longer is copyright the
story of oppressed Authors victimized by big Publishers seeking
refuge in the protection granted by Congress in the Copyright Act.
Instead, the development of copyright law itself comprises an in-
teractive and complex narrative involving music publishers, com-
posers, record companies, recording artists, radio interests, and
Webcasters, among others. As this narrative has become too intri-
12 Id. at 491.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2000) provides:
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct
from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in
the author of the contribution. In the absence of an express transfer of
the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the col-
lective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of repro-
ducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular collec-
tive work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective
work in the same series.
See also Tasini, 533 U.S. at 494-96.
14 See id. at 500-02.
15 Id. at 505-06.
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cate either to be fair to Authors (in this respect, the revised story
adopts the premise of Tasini) or to be persuasive to its audience'
6
(in this respect, it extends Tasini), it needs an alternative resolu-
tion. Simply declaring that Authors are heroes (as the Court did,
rhetorically, in Tasini), does not suffice. Instead, the narrative
should be simplified.
To borrow language from the domain of motion pictures, the
Court's opinion in Tasini rhetorically indulges the fictionalized
genius composer portrayed by Tom Hulce in the film adaptation of
Peter Shaffer's Amadeus.' 7  Art, that film argues, demands ac-
commodating authorial excess. Copyright, the Court implies, de-
mands accommodating what might appear to be excessive de-
mands of Authors. Untangling the Web in effect borrows a differ-
ent theme from that same film, less inspiring but more pragmatic.
It adopts the alternative resolution proposed by the Emperor Jo-
seph II, as immortalized on screen by Jeffrey Jones, in his critique
of Mozart: "My dear young man, don't take it too hard. Your
work is ingenious. It's quality work. And there are simply too
many notes, that's all. Just cut a few and it will be perfect." The
"too many notes" in Untangling the Web are the lack of derivative
work independence, the statutory license for mechanical reproduc-
tions of musical compositions, and the multiplicity of overlapping
rights represented in section 106 of the Copyright Act.' 8 Cutting
those notes will not solve all of the problems of contemporary
copyright law. Cutting them does, however, address the most sig-
nificant problems faced by the music industry. Equally important,
doing so brings closure to the more elaborate narrative about copy-
right that requires both compensation to Authors and incentives to
take advantage of multiple avenues for distributing works to the
consuming Public. Untangling the Web usefully points out that the
Court's narrative in Tasini, even if that narrative is appropriate in
the context of that case, does not fit the music business. The his-
tory and interests of that business, and perhaps of others, require
telling a more elaborate story.
With the door thus opened to multiple narratives and different
endings, the balance of this Commentary reviews, in Rashomon-
like fashion,' 9 several others. Some are suggested by the opinions
of the majority and dissent in Tasini. Some are suggested by Un-
16 Jessica Utman makes this point with respect to consumers in The Exclusive Right to
Read, 13 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 34-39 (1994).
17 AMADEUS (Warner Bros. 1984).
IS See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
19 RASHOMON (1950; U.S. Distrib. RKO Radio Pictures, 1951). Kurosawa's classic film
tells the story of a rape from the perspective of four different characters.
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tangling the Web. Others claim no particular birthright but might
be traced more broadly to themes circulating in contemporary dis-
cussions of copyright law and policy. Each "story" invokes the
motion picture theme introduced above, and each is organized
around a famous movie quotation. I cannot argue that any one of
these is any more "right" than Tasini as an account of copyright
arguments. 20 I do suggest that these are fair game for lawyers,
judges, and policymakers. One or more of them may be coming to
a courtroom soon.
III. OTHER STORIES OF COPYRIGHT
A. "Follow the money"
21
The investigative reporters Bob Woodward (played by Robert
Redford) and Carl Bernstein (Dustin Hoffman) in All The Presi-
dent's Men looked beyond the narrow question (who broke into the
headquarters of the Democratic National Committee at the Water-
gate complex?). Taking cues from "Deep Throat," the still-
unidentified source who urged them to "follow the money," they
followed a trail that led to the Oval Office. Much as the film has
been praised as a portrait of working journalists, however, the pro-
tagonist in the Watergate saga, however, turns out not to be the
reporters themselves (although they were frequently challenged by
their editors). The protagonist turns out to be the public interest,
vindicated in the end by the recognition ultimately given Wood-
ward and Bernstein 22 and by the resignation of President Nixon.
The version of Tasini that focuses on Authors' rights to fair
compensation from Publishers appears to overlook broader themes
in the same way that Woodward and Bernstein initially overlooked
the scale of the Watergate story and that the editors of the Wash-
ington Post initially overlooked the work of Woodward and Bern-
stein. To the Tasini majority's emphasis on "authorial" rights, the
dissent responds:
[T]he primary purpose of copyright is not to reward the au-
thor, but is rather to secure 'the general benefits derived by
the public from the labors of authors.' . .. The majority's de-
cision today unnecessarily subverts this fundamental goal of
copyright law in favor of a narrow focus on 'authorial rights.'
20 I do have my personal favorite, which is reflected in the title of the Commentary.
21 Hal Holbrook as "Deep Throat," in ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (Warner Brothers
1976).22 The Washington Post won a Pulitzer Prize in 1973 for their reporting.
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. . . Although the desire to protect such rights is certainly a
laudable sentiment, copyright law demands that 'private mo-
tivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.,
23
The Tasini majority have their reply ready. The Authors,
though victorious, are not necessarily entitled to injunctive relief.
"The parties (Authors and Publishers) may enter into an agreement
allowing continued electronic reproduction of the Authors' works;
they, and if necessary the courts and Congress, may draw on nu-
merous models for distributing copyrighted works and remunerat-
ing authors for their distribution. 24 At least in this brief aside, the
Court is not inattentive to some of the broader implications of its
holding.25 Its story seems to hold together.
Yet the majority's variation on the story of Tasini, one that
acknowledges that there are multiple ways to compensate Authors,
is incomplete. In All the President's Men, the story of Watergate
was not resolved by disclosure of the fact that the Plumbers who
broke into the Democrats' Watergate headquarters were financially
linked to the Nixon White House. The public interest was not
served merely by knowledge of the extent to which the political
process was corrupt. The corruption itself had to be addressed.
The copyright story that I am suggesting here is metaphorical, not
literal; there is no evidence that negotiations among Authors and
Publishers are "corrupt. 26 Yet the form that the Tasini narrative
takes, that the players consist of abstractions known as Authors
and Publishers and the Public, and all can be served via statutory
interpretation and licensing, seems almost willfully blind to the
extent to which contemporary copyright debates depend upon the
organization of large-scale markets for what copyright terms
23 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 519-20 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
24 Id. at 505; see Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996) (arguing that
strong property rules for intellectual property rights are likely to encourage the development of
collective rights organizations to license those rights).
25 In context, it is difficult to tell how seriously the Court intended this quotation. Imme-
diately following this quotation, the Court majority disclaims judging the wisdom of a compul-
sory licensing approach, by emphasizing the plaintiffs' authorial rights. See Tasini, 533 U.S. at
506. On the other hand, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994), the Court fa-
mously suggested that injunctive relief may not always be the appropriate remedy for infringe-
ment-by-parody. See id. at 578 n. 10.
26 Well, there is some evidence on this point. See, e.g., Lauren J. Katunich, Note, Time to
Quit Paying the Payola Pipe: Why Music Industry Abuse Demands a Complete System Over-
haul, 22 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 643, 643-45 (2002) (addressing the need for the restructuring
of federal payola laws to promote a more honest music industry).
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66,,27
"works of authorship. Tasini resolves the apparent problem, but
it does not deal with the underlying issues. As a result of the
Court's judgment that reproducing freelance newspaper articles in
electronic databases does not fall within the revision privilege of
section 201(c) of the Copyright Act, Authors have a negotiating
lever, in principle, that in many circumstances they previously
lacked. As a practical matter, freelance authors and photographers
see little if any of this extra compensation. As the other contribu-
tions to this Symposium make clear, the structure of the publishing
industries and publishers' power to require contractual forfeiture
of Tasini-based electronic publishing rights is overwhelming.
The "Follow the money" story about copyright, then, is this:
If we are serious about providing authors and other creators with
fair compensation for their efforts, and balancing that compensa-
tion with appropriate levels of access for new creators and for con-
sumers, then we need to do more than reform copyright law itself
(the narrow point of the Tasini majority, the broader theme of the
Tasini dissent, and the argument of Untangling the Web); we need
to examine structural reform of the publishing and distribution in-
dustries, using not only copyright law but also tools of the com-
mon law and of unfair competition law.28
B. "What we have here is failure to communicate"29
Cool Hand Luke is a 1960s parable of the counterculture, the
story of a free-spirited iconoclast who escapes from "the system"
and resists a return at all costs. The setting is a Southern work
farm. The iconoclast is a prisoner/escapee (Luke) played by Paul
Newman, and his antagonist is a nameless prison captain played by
Strother Martin, who uses the line quoted above to try to entice
Newman to give up life on the lam. Newman will have none of it.
He chooses death instead. The prison captain's appeal to Newman
is, metaphorically speaking, the appeal of transactions costs. It is
cheaper and easier for Newman to play by the rules than for him to
set himself up as the outsider. Most, if not all, of copyright law
can be similarly understood as an appeal to transactions costs. It is
cheaper and easier to find efficient ways to compensate Authors
and Publishers than it is to justify reasons not to do so. In this
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
28 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual
Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 115-16 (1999) (arguing that the influence of intellec-
tual property law and policy is a function of federal preemption as well as copyright misuse,
federal public policy, and state intellectual property rules).
29 Strother Martin as the prison captain, in COOL HAND LUKE (Warner Brothers 1967).
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spirit, Untangling the Web identifies the enormous transaction
costs involved in the rights clearances required to produce, per-
form, and distribute recorded music as one major consequence of
the complexity of the copyright industries. 30  Fewer transactions
costs will bring us a cheaper, easier, and more efficient copyright
system.
But what of Paul Newman? Can problems with copyright
law, even only within the copyright dimensions of the music in-
dustry, be solved by better communications? Can transaction cost
analysis bring us a stable copyright system? Complexity equiva-
lent to that identified in the music industry consumes hundreds of
thousands of dollars per year in the motion picture industry, in
commercial book publishing, and in academic teaching and pub-
lishing, among other places. That complexity does not begin to
count the transaction costs associated with consumer use of and
access to copyrighted works, whether those works are in electronic
form (and thus likely guarded not only by copyright, but also by
the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act,3' by click-through agreements, 32 and by the doctrine of
trespass to chattels 33) or not. We can clear out many of those
transaction costs and simplify the system by limiting the nature
and number of the exclusive rights currently held by different
copyright interests. Yet making transaction costs even the initial
focus of copyright policy risks overlooking some foundational
questions. 34  Perhaps the story of copyright is that of Luke, the
iconoclast outsider, rather than that of the authority of the system.
To what extent are relevant copyright industries, including "au-
thors," entitled to compensation in the first place? To what extent
are consumers, users, and new creators wrongly led to assume that
they ought to compensate? 35 Copyright itself may be a species of
30 The article's careful analysis of the role of transactions costs is consistent with Profes-
sor Loren's earlier work. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to
Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 7-8 (1997) (ex-
ploring the use and misuse of the market failure approach in fair use cases with a focus on per-
mission systems and non-transformative fair uses).
31 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205.
32 See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding
that the defendants did not provide reasonable notice of license terms in locating the terms at the
bottom of a webpage below the download button and accessible only through scrolling down-
ward).
-3 See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(granting preliminary injunctive relief to eBay based on its trespass claim).
14 For a similar argument from inside an economics perspective, see Julie E. Cohen,
Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000).
35 See Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 1025 (1998).
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transactions CoSt. 36  There may be no reason a priori to prefer
transactions costs that appear to operate in favor of one class of
copyright interests (the already published) over those that appear
to operate in favor of others (those yet to create).37 Costs of one
sort or another, and a complex copyright system, may simply be
part of the price we pay for reasonable limits on authors' and pub-
lishers' demands for compensation, in the service of other inter-
ests.
C. "Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn., 38
Complexity is, well, complex. The Cool Hand Luke scenario
tries to argue that consumers and new creators may benefit from
copyright complexity. But consumers and new creators are also
opting out of the consensual copyright system, in part because they
just cannot fathom its complexity. Copyright consumers, in these
words of Rhett Butler in Gone With the Wind, may no longer give
a damn about authors and publishers. Gone With the Wind is,
among other things, a love story gone sour. The film's heroine,
Scarlett O'Hara, is both an individualized romantic ideal and the
symbol of the "pure" white antebellum South, and in both roles she
holds an improbable appeal for the modern cynic, Captain Rhett
Butler. Her copyright parallel is the Author idealized by the Court
in Tasini, entitled to the favor of the law notwithstanding the con-
sequences to others. Her apparent triumph over adversity (the col-
lapse of the South, the collapse of her family, and collapse of her
marriage) parallels the Authorial triumph.
The story of copyright law may not be the story of Scarlett,
but the story of Rhett, modern and cynical and ultimately repulsed
by Scarlett's incomprehensibility and endless demands for ac-
commodation in a vastly changed world.39 Untangling the Web
properly points out that the current system of rights clearances
makes accessing and enjoying music needlessly expensive, and at
36 "[Lord] Macaulay wrote that copyright is 'a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a
bounty to writers."' New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 584, 519 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting T. MACAULAY, SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT 11 (A. Thorndike ed., 1915)).
37 But see Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the "Information Superhighway": Authors,
Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1468 (1995) ("[Tlhe per-
spective of user rights, albeit important, should remain secondary. Without authors, there are no
works to use.").
38 Clark Gable as Rhett Butler, in GONE WITH THE WIND (Warner Bros. 1939).
39 As copyright scholars know well, a different retelling of Gone With the Wind led to an
epic copyright battle and a most interesting opinion ultimately affirming the right of the new
author and publisher to distribute their version. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268
F.3d 1257, 1259 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (vacating preliminary injunction preventing distribution of
parody entitled "The Wind Done Gone").
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times too expensive to bother. Perhaps we should take the argu-
ment farther. Significant numbers of music consumers, even con-
sumers and other users of all works of authorship, may now be
recognizing that the romance of the deserving Author (represented
in this narrative example by Scarlett O'Hara) has faded, and not
just because that romantic ideal never existed in the first place.
40
Litigation and controversy over digital music4  and over digital
copyrights generally in the consumer context may have a signaling
function. 42  Copyright owners may intend the signal to be a mes-
sage about the need to comply with existing copyright norms. The
unintended interpretation of the signal may be different. Consum-
ers may not be sophisticated enough in general to grasp the'details,
but they may be savvy and cynical enough to react as Rhett Butler
did when confronted with one too many demands by Scarlett:
"Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn." Consumers are told by
40 The deconstruction of the romantic author from historical, critical, and philosophical
perspectives has been underway for some time, most notably in the work of Peter Jaszi, Martha
Woodmansee, Mark Rose, James Boyle, Keith Aoki, and Michel Foucault. See, e.g., JAMES
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS x-xiii (1996) (discussing the role the ideology of
authorship might play in an information society); THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEX-
TUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LIrERATURE 1-13 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds.,
1994) (providing various insights into authorship and copyright demonstrating that the concep-
tion of the author as the bearer of legal rights and cultural privileges implicates how power and
wealth are distributed); Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, reprinted in LANGUAGE,
COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE 113 (Donald F. Bouchard ed., 1977) (1969); MARK ROSE, AU-
THORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993) (discussing the role of authorship
in copyright and the contradiction between the romantic idea of authorship underlying copyright
and the corporate reality of the entertainment industry); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and
Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1294-
99 (1996) (noting the delineation between public and private in intellectual property law is
vested in the deeply imbedded concept of romantic authorship); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of
Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (explaining how copy-
right law deals with the "authorship construct" inherited from literary and artistic culture); see
also Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the
Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725 (1993) (examining copyright law in light of principles of
contemporary literary criticism). But see Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rheto-
ric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE
& SPLEENS (1996)) (suggesting that the explanatory power of the "romantic Author" thesis has
limits). Despite this work, the Author remains central to copyright law, and to some, rightfully
so. See David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38
HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2001) (arguing that "intent" should be the touchstone of authorship under
American copyright law).
41 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001)
(affirming entry of injunction against Intemet-based system supporting peer-to-peer transmis-
sions of digital music files); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the defendant infringed plaintiffs copyrights by providing ser-
vices allowing Internet users to access digital music files stored on defendant's servers).
42 In a different intellectual property context, Clarisa Long has argued that patenting be-
havior can be understood as a manifestation of industry signaling. See Clarisa Long, Patent
Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625 (2002). Eric Posner argues that social norms are understood as
collections of signals that individuals use for organizing informally. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW
AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
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copyright owners that culture has its price, and copyright law is the
mechanism by which that price is enforced. But consumers also
know, more than they ever did before, that the "art" that they read,
watch, listen to, and otherwise use derives from corporate hierar-
chies. The copyright industries have successfully commoditized
culture, making what was a relatively elite industry at the time of
copyright's inception three centuries ago into a mass and popular
phenomenon. In important senses, copyrighted books, records,
movies, and computer programs are no different than mass-
produced, fungible widgets. Copyright industries should not be
surprised to see their story take this turn, with consumers treating
the resulting products with consumerist indifference.43
D. "I like to watch"44
Sometimes, the virtues of simplicity are overrated. Being
There is Jerzy Kozinski's cautionary tale of an ordinary man, a
simple man, whose quiet observations about his daily experience
(and his knowledge of the world, derived entirely from a lifetime
of watching television) are wildly misinterpreted by those around
him. The phrase "I like to watch," which in its original form refers
to the main character's interest in television, becomes a statement
of profound, worldly reserve. Peter Sellers's Chance the Gardener
(acknowledged by those around him as "Chauncey Gardner") re-
tains his innocence to the end, while those around him are made
out to be fools. The film itself is hardly simple (the simplicity of
Chance the Gardener is not made out to be foolish; the film scorns
those who project their preferences for the simple onto him), and it
follows a less conventional narrative than other examples in this
Commentary. Here, I use the film and its signature quotation to
suggest that acknowledging and accepting complexity can bring
benefits. Untangling the Web suggests some provocative and
likely beneficial simplifications of copyright doctrine. Simplicity,
however, cannot be the law's only benchmark. Complexity has an
important role in the story of copyright, both as a description of
copyright's past and perhaps as a prescription for copyright's fu-
ture. Complexity in current copyright law is partly a result of un-
coordinated political responses to particular cases. It is partly a
result of the uses of economic power. It is partly a result of legis-
41 Of course, the final chapter to this story of copyright has yet to be written; even Gone
With the Wind ends not with Rhett's signature line, but with the resilience of Scarlett, who pro-
claims, "Tomorrow is another day." Vivian Leigh as Scarlett O'Hara, in GONE WITH THE WIND
(Warner Bros. 1939).
4 Peter Sellers as Chance the Gardener, in BEING THERE (Warner Brothers 1979).
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lative and judicial adaptations of copyright principles to changing
technology. And complexity in copyright is partly a result of the
mass production of and demand for cultural expression, to an ex-
tent never witnessed before the early twenieth century. Nineteenth
century copyright law could afford to be simple, since the sources
of cultural production were few and the demand for cultural prod-
ucts relatively limited.
In other words, complexity in copyright may be an unavoid-
able feature of a diverse society, with unresolved conflicts regard-
ing cultural and economic interests. The story of copyright in the
future may be not, "Why isn't the copyright system simple?," but
instead "When is simplicity appropriate, and when we should live
with complexity?" Even in a domain such as the music industry,
where simplicity seems far preferable to the morass of interests
and rights that now plague the business, contrasts between compet-
ing interests and competing norms highlight important issues for
resolution - or preservation. The process of addressing those con-
flicts over time can produce imprecise but enduring solutions, rec-
ognizing both the persistence and the variability of the interests
that produced them. Permanent resolution of those disputes may
not be feasible. This story may not have a happy ending, or even
an ending at all. It may, however, be the most accurate in repre-
senting the world as it actually is.
E. "Romeo and Ethel, the Pirate's Daughter
45
Where does creativity come from? 4 6  How do "creative"
works of authorship come about? We care about the copyright
system because we care about the answers to these questions, yet
the questions are rarely asked in a formal way in connection with
45 Joseph Fiennes as Will Shakespeare, giving the title of his next play, in SHAKESPEARE
IN LOVE (Miramax 1998). A close runner-up for this category was "Inconceivable!." Wallace
Shawn as Vizzini, in THE PRINCESS BRIDE (MGM/United Artists 1987).
46 The term "creativity" comes freighted with an enormous amount of scholarly baggage.
Connections among the philosophical and psychological literature (focusing on the mental proc-
esses of the creative individual, and to some extent on social influences on the individual), and
copyright standards, are explored in Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 801, 824-44 (1993). A good introductory collection of the psychological literature is
HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 1999). The popular celebration of creativ-
ity as a characteristic of the gifted "creative person" is reflected in contemporary works such as
HAROLD BLOOM, GENIUS: A MOSAIC OF ONE HUNDRED EXEMPLARY CREATIVE MINDS (2002)
and MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY
AND INVENTION (1997) and in recent legal scholarship such as Alan L. Durham, The Random
Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569 (2002). For an older
example of the genre, see THE CREATIVE PROCESS (Brewster Ghiselin ed., 1952). Some com-
puter scientists have begun to model emergent (creative) behavior in automated systems, with
no ongoing human influence. See MITCHEL RESNICK, TURTLES, TERMITES, AND TRAFFIC
JAMES: EXPLORATIONS IN MASSIVELY PARALLEL MICROWORLDS (1997).
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copyright debates. In Shakespeare in Love the screenwriter Tom
Stoppard (with collaborator Marc Norman) uses "Romeo and
Ethel, the Pirate's Daughter" as the working title of the play that
becomes "Romeo and Juliet," not only to mock the notion that
Shakespeare composed his plays as a sole "romantic" author but to
remind us of the sometimes messy, unplanned, accidental, idiosyn-
cratic nature of creativity and creation. It has been long recog-
nized that Shakespeare borrowed shamelessly, from contemporar-
ies, fellow actors, Anglo-Saxon literature, and Roman historians
and playwrights. 47 What we do not know is how purposive or for-
tuitous this process was. Likewise, in connection with copyright,
we do not often ask whether the notion of authorship matters. We
know, both in Tasini and in Untangling the Web, that authorship
shapes the character of copyright law. But does authorship shape
what copyright law cares about - the creative work of authorship?
"Authorship" of a sort does matter both in law and in practice,
even if authorship is merely a literary conceit, so long as the crea-
tive process, whether individuated or collective, is more or less
purposive. Copyright as a system of incentives must start with
someone to reward. Copyright as a system of moral right must
start with someone with a soul, or at least with free will.48  The
Second Circuit once suggested that the work of the accidental au-
thor could be protected, on the ground that what mattered was not
the "authorship" but the character of the resulting "work. 49 The
Supreme Court appears to have corrected that impression in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Co. 50 In Feist, the
Court emphasized that a copyrightable work of authorship must
manifest a "modicum" of what the Court characterized as
"intellectual production, . . . thought, and conception."'
Purposive authorship is required, even though the legal threshold
for demonstrating its existence is extremely low.
Suppose the Purposive Author does not exist. As Stoppard
inverts our assumptions about Shakespeare, perhaps copyright
47 The name "Shakespeare" itself is alleged to have been borrowed. See, e.g., John Paul
Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1373(1992) (examining the view that Edward de Vere is the author of the Shakespeare Canon); see
also John Paul Stevens, Section 43(A) of the Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, I J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 179, 188-90 n.38 (2002) (elaborating on the theory that
Shakespeare was really Edward de Vere).
41 See generally Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287(1988) (comparing intellectual property theories with general property theories).
49 See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1951)(discussing, in dicta, how a bad copying job may produce distinguishing variations).
- 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
51 Id. (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1884)).
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should invert its presumption of authorship, not (only) because
authorship is a literary fiction, but because we might develop an
empirical model that declares that most works of authorship have
significant, or are even dominated by, non-purposive components.
In that sense, where does creativity come from? What sources do
authors of new works draw on, when, and to what extent? The
proposition should be tested; if it turns out that the dominant
model (at least in a given industry or artistic community) is that of
Stoppard's Shakespeare, rather than the romantic genius Shake-
speare (or Shaffer's Mozart), that might tell us a number of things
about how copyright law should be shaped.
For example, advocates of copyright reform today point out
that consumers have legitimate interests in access to works of au-
thorship at a reasonable cost, even sometimes for free. Why? Be-
cause they might be new authors, inevitably standing on the shoul-
ders of those who came before.52 Because they need to exercise
their rights as citizens of a democratic republic. Because they
need to flourish as fully-realized individuals. Or because they
build communities of different sorts using the language of com-
mon culture. If Stoppard's Shakespeare supplies the model of the
Author, the force of some or even all of these theories may be re-
evaluated. Among other things, copyright's author-centered, in-
centive-driven philosophy would carry far less weight. Inadvertent
authors presumably need little incentive to create, but they might
need broad incentives to distribute. What becomes of the avail-
ability of copyright protection? Should we protect the inadvertent
work at all? Or protect only a narrow range of authentically inno-
vative and purposive creativity? Or something else? The scope of
sections 106 and 107 of the Copyright Act 53 might be broadened,
or narrowed, and compulsory licenses in copyright re-examined.
Different types or classes of authors may work in systematically
different ways, suggesting that copyright's contours should vary,
rather than remaining uniform across time and across all works.
To flesh out this story about copyright, what is needed is not theo-
rizing but research. How does information of different types, and
52 See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting Sir
Isaac Newton - "If I have seen further it is by standing upon the shoulders of Giants" - as sup-
port for the freedom of abstract ideas from intellectual property protection). The science histo-
rian John Gribbin suggests that Newton's remark was a cutting characterization of his rival
Robert Hooke and thus should be seen as evidence of Newton's refusal to credit any of his
predecessors. See JOHN GRIBBIN, SCIENCE: A HISTORY 1543-2001 163-64 (2002). The classic
investigation of the quotation is ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A
SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1965) (tracing its origins to the twelfth century).
53 Section 106 provides the basic menu of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner;
section 107 is the codified doctrine of fair use. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107 (2000).
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particularly works of creative authors, figure in different types of
further creativity (whether copyrightable, or not), or cultural dia-
logue, or self-building? 54  If we do not need incentives to create,
do we nonetheless need incentives to distribute, or publish, so that
the inadvertent creator has a field of resources to draw on? The
questions are similar to, but not the same as, "Why do people cre-
ate things?" and "Can there really be something called 'author-
ship?"' The new questions include, "How do 'authors' behave?"
and "What kinds of resources do different authors use, and how,
and when?"
Until we have better answers for these questions, we will have
a difficult time pinning down the costs and benefits of both the
current system and any alternatives. That is, we may never con-
struct a truly persuasive story about copyright. We need research
and analysis that explores not only, "Do we need the incentive of
intellectual property law or of copyright in particular?," but in
what ways and by what methods do creators (individuals, firms,
other institutions) draw on different resources in the creative proc-
ess, and what does that tell us about how the relevant legal regime
should be structured? We have workable supply-side models of
law and creativity.5 The law declares that it provides incentives
of different sorts to create. We need demand-side models, and
empirical investigation of their robustness. 56  What kinds of in-
puts do different kinds of creators need or use? How are works
created?
F. "I'll make him an offer he can't refuse"57
The Godfather needs little explanation or summary, as one of
the few motion pictures of the last 25 years that has not only ex-
54 I recognize that in framing these questions, I indulge some Western assumptions about
the possibility and nature of "individual" creativity.
5 In fact, we have less a complete model than a robust set of untested assumptions about
the incentive value of the copyright system. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the
labor of authors, but to encourage the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.") (citations omit-
ted); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (stating
that the Framers intended copyright to be "the engine of free expression"); THE FEDERALIST NO.
43 (James Madison) ("The utility of this [intellectual property] power will scarcely be ques-
tioned .... The public good fully coincides ... with the claims of individuals.").
56 Cf. Cohen, supra note 34, at 1819 ("We need an economic syntax that acknowledges
and accommodates the essentially unpredictable nature of creativity, and an economic model
that focuses on creating the conditions for random or fortuitous access to copyrighted content.").
57 Marlon Brando as Don Corleone, in THE GODFATHER (Paramount 1972). First runner-
up in this category is the following: "I once asked this literary agent what type of writing paid
the best. He said 'ransom notes."' Gene Hackman as Harry Zimm, in GET SHORTY
(MGM/United Artists 1995).
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plored American mythology but that has assumed almost mythic
status itself.58 The story of The Godfather, like the received story
of copyright, 59 is the story of capitalism. As Francis Ford Coppola
pointed out in the film, the capitalist system represents opportuni-
ties that may both create and represent the American dream, but
those opportunities come with an underside that cannot be ignored.
Like the Mafia Don Corleone, who capped discussions of recalci-
trant "business" partners with the coded threat quoted above, par-
ties on all sides of copyright debates often assume that creation
and distribution of copyrighted works are purely incentive-driven
enterprises. The only way in which copyright and its incentives
may legitimately relate to creative expression is via the marginal
dollar (or euro, or yen, etc.) and the propertization of the intangi-
ble that is otherwise too easy to steal. The capitalist story about
copyright logically concludes with the argument that all means are
legitimate to prevent "theft" and enforce the market dynamic.
I cannot come up with a retelling of The Godfather that un-
does this logic, though one could imagine a market economy with-
out "market failures" of one sort or another. 60 The alternative
story about copyright here may not have a filmic parallel. We may
be trapped, at some level, by our characterization of intellectual
property as property, and by the congruence of the intellectual
property rights "system," our capitalist assumptions, and the desire
to capture that system and its assumptions in a comprehensive nar-
rative framework of one sort or another.
It was not always so. Copyrights and patents have been
around for centuries, but the phrase "intellectual property" as a
general concept encompassing both fields did not enter American
legal terminology until the mid-i 800s 61 and did not enter the main-
stream legal lexicon here for more than a century. The label ob-
scures differences between copyright and patent, and obscures sub-
58 According to Tom Hanks as Joe Fox in YOU'VE GOT MAIL (Warner Studios, 1998),
"[t]he Godfather is the I Ching. The Godfather is the sum of all wisdom. The Godfather is the
answer to any question."
59 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Distant Drumbeat: Why the Law Still Matters in the Infor-
mation Era, 20 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 259, 261-62 (2002) (discussing how capitalism
furthers creativity and the invention of new ideas and products).
60 The Don's threat could be characterized itself as a form of market failure rather than
market discipline, but that characterization admits the possibility of exiting the market alto-
gether. That is precisely the possibility that The Godfather argues American capitalism negates.
61 See Davoll v. Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C. D. Mass. 1845); Mark A. Lemley, Ro-
mantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEx. L. REV. 873, 895 n.123 (1997) (exam-
ining the evolution of the term "intellectual property"). Copyrights and patents were more
likely to be referred to as "monopolies" than "property" in the 19th century. See William W.
Fisher II, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the
United States, at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/property99/history.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
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tleties within them. Within copyright, the label "property" sug-
gests that all of copyright is a manifestation of a common impulse
to preserve and protect the Author's output, when in fact (as Un-
tangling the Web teaches) copyright law comes from a variety of
sources and impulses.
The Godfather's story about copyright may thus be a non-
Godfather story about copyright. The underside of capitalism in
copyright ought to be exposed and replaced. Modern American
legal education is at least partly to blame for shielding students
and lawyers from this underside. We teach beginning lawyers that
these bodies of law (copyright, patent, and trademark) are con-
nected and that what connects them is their ability to create invisi-
ble property rights that protect investment-backed expectations and
limit "the tragedy of the [intangible] commons." We teach the
commodity and the economy of intellectual property. We do not,
as a rule, also teach the morality and humanity of copyright and the
production of cultural goods, either domestically or, importantly,
internationally.62 We should. Those themes should be part of yet
another story about what copyright might be, and about what copy-
right might become.
CONCLUSION
Stories simplify. They may conceal as much as they illumi-
nate. There is much missing in these accounts. The stories them-
selves are more suggestive than exhaustive. I have avoided mak-
ing explicit judgments about which of them, or any other, is the
right or best story about copyright. I have avoided setting up any
method for evaluating their respective merits. I have avoided ap-
plying them, or any of them, to particular copyright problems.
This is not post-modernism; at least, I do not intend it as such. It
is a lawyer's effort to articulate some arguments about copyright
law in ways that may be useful in contemporary debate. It seems
to me that the very point of the legal system (at least the American
legal system) is to enable scholars, policymakers, and advocates of
different positions to bring their best arguments to their respective
tables. Stories are powerful tools in this process. Where the Su-
preme Court appears to have adopted one story among many pos-
sibilities as the basis for its decision in Tasini, it seems only proper
for the rest of us to raise the possibility of competing stories, if
62 See generally Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellec-
tual Property and the Public Domain, 18 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 1 (1993) (Part 1); 191(1994) (Part II) (describing consequences for public-ness of international cultures of private
intellectual property protection).
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only to ensure that the law that results best fits the facts of the
case, and society's needs.

